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Protection Legislation
Shauhin A. Talesh

This article explores how private organizations influence the content and meaning of
consumer protection legislation. I examine why California forced consumers to use a
private dispute resolution system that affords consumers fewer rights, while Vermont
adopted a state-run disputing structure that affords consumers greater rights. Drawing
from historical and new institutional theories, I analyze twenty-five years of legislative
history, as well as interviews with drafters of the California and Vermont laws, to show
how automobile manufacturers weakened the impact of a powerful California consumer
warranty law by creating dispute resolution venues. As these structures became institutionalized in the lemon law field, manufacturers reshaped the meaning of legislation.
Unlike California, the political alliances in Vermont and a different developmental path
led to a state-run dispute resolution structure. I conclude that how social reform laws are
designed and how businesses influence social reform legislation can increase or decrease
the achievement of a statute’s social reform goals.

INTRODUCTION
With varying degrees of success, social reform advocates in the United States use
the legislative process to address broad social problems such as race, gender, and
economic inequality. Law and society scholars, in turn, often conduct empirical
research that explores law’s capacity to produce social change (Rosenberg 1991;
Williams 1991; McCann 1994; Engel and Munger 1996; Albiston 1999). Too often,
however, empirical studies in this vein evaluate whether legislation works and leads to
social reform without looking at variation. This is partly because empirical studies on
social reform laws typically evaluate one federal law, for example, Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, or the Family Medical Leave Act, as opposed to studying the
variation in state laws. Scholars rarely treat states as “laboratories of democracy” and
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compare how legislation is drafted and enacted impacts whether social reform laws are
more likely to achieve reform. This article does not focus on the success or failure of
social reform legislation, but on under what conditions social reform legislation is more
likely to facilitate or inhibit consumer inequality in society. My study suggests that the
process through which social reform laws are enacted, and how organizations influence
the content and meaning of legislation, impacts the likelihood that the desired social
reform goals are achieved.
State consumer warranty laws provide an ideal setting to address this question
because consumer rights have been, through legislative codification, routed into several
different dispute resolution systems operating outside the court system. In the 1970s and
1980s, states across the United States adopted consumer warranty laws for buyers of
automobiles. These consumer protection laws responded to widespread problems of
manufacturers failing to make safe automobiles and, more precisely, failing to make
repairs under their warranties. Attempting to put manufacturers and consumers on a
more even playing field, these laws afforded consumers the ability to go to court and seek
replacement or repurchase of their vehicle, attorney fees, and sometimes a civil penalty
if manufacturers failed to comply with their warranties. Although today consumers in
most states can still take their claims under these laws to court, they seldom do. Instead,
consumer rights are now largely contingent on first using alternative dispute resolution
structures, some created and operated by private organizations and others run by states. In
particular, all fifty states allow consumers the option of having their automobile lemon
law disputes resolved in dispute resolution forums funded by automobile manufacturers
but operated by external third-party organizations. In addition to allowing consumers to
use the private dispute resolution forum, thirteen states also allow consumers the choice
of using a state-run dispute resolution forum instead. California was the first state to enact
a consumer warranty law and the second state to amend its law to make public legal rights
contingent on using private dispute resolution forums.1 Vermont was the first state to
codify a state-run dispute resolution system into law.
Moreover, there is at least some evidence that the content and meaning of these
social reform laws and, in particular, the institutional design of these dispute resolution
forums consumers are asked to use, matter with respect to how likely consumers are to
achieve the relief they seek. My prior study of consumer lemon law arbitration awards
revealed that outcome data on who wins between consumers and manufacturers in
these private and state-run disputing forums in California and Vermont significantly
diverge (Talesh 2012). Specifically, from 1996–2007, consumers obtained a full refund
or replacement vehicle almost twice as often in Vermont’s public dispute resolution
system (59 percent) as in California’s private system (30 percent) (Talesh 2012).2 Thus,
whether consumers achieve relief under these two social reform laws appears at least
partially contingent on whether they seek relief in private or state-run dispute resolution structures. In fact, data on how consumers fare in private dispute resolution
1. In fact, California was the first state to attempt to create a lemon law. However, while California
struggled to pass its lemon law, Connecticut borrowed California’s proposed bill and passed a specific law
protecting automobile owners. The passage of Connecticut’s lemon law in 1982 was largely modeled after
California’s failed bills in 1980 and 1981.
2. Moreover, Vermont consumers overwhelmingly elect to go through the state-run dispute resolution
system rather than the private process.
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structures across all fifty states mirror the consumers’ win rate in California, while
consumers fare better in the thirteen states that have state-run dispute resolution
structures.
Evaluating the conditions that social reform legislation is more likely to neutralize
the imbalance of power between consumers and manufacturers led me to an interesting
set of research subquestions that focus on the organizations and actors participating in
the legislative process: (1) Why did California codify a private dispute resolution system
into law while Vermont ultimately adopted both private and state-run dispute resolution systems into law? and (2) Under what conditions do private organizations influence
the content and meaning of social reform legislation?
To answer these questions, I draw on and link two literatures concerning the role
that organizations play in shaping and changing legal institutions: political science
historical institutional studies of how institutions stay stable and at times change amid
various levels of business influence and new institutional organizational sociology
studies of how organizations shape law within their organizational field. Historical
institutionalists explain institutional development, stability, and change by examining
when events occur and specifically explore how questions of timing and path dependency impact politics and public policy (Pierson 2004). Focusing less on politics and
timing, new institutionalists argue that as organizational norms and values diffuse
among organizations, they eventually become institutionalized within a community or
field of similar organizations (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983;
Scott 1992). More recently, scholars have been exploring how institutionalized norms
among organizations eventually influence the content and meaning of law among
public legal institutions (Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger 1999; Talesh 2009, 2013;
Edelman et al. 2011). Neither theory alone explains why California made powerful
consumer rights contingent on using private dispute resolution structures while
Vermont provided consumers with the option of using a state-run dispute resolution
process. In this instance, new institutional theory and historical theories of institutional
change, stability, and political action work together to explain the configuration of the
lemon law field. New institutional approaches explain why private dispute resolution
structures diffused across both states (and in fact all fifty states), while politics and path
dependency explain why the form and control of each structure was different in California and Vermont.
Through a quantitative coding and qualitative content analysis of twenty-five
years of legislative history, as well as interviews with legislative analysts involved in
crafting laws in both California and Vermont, this article shows how automobile
manufacturers, who were initially subject to a powerful consumer warranty law in
California in 1971, transformed and ultimately weakened the impact of this law by
creating their own dispute resolution venues. As these legalized structures became
institutionalized among the organizational field and eventually run by third-party organizational surrogates, manufacturers infused business values into California legislation
in varying degrees and reshaped the meaning of law and compliance among not just
organizations, but also in the legislature. As a result of such legislation, consumer rights
and remedies became largely contingent on first using third-party dispute resolution
structures funded by manufacturers where rights and remedies equivalent to those
available in court do not exist.
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As was the case in California, the Vermont legislature in 1984 reached consensus
that alternative dispute resolution (ADR) forums as opposed to courts were the proper
place to resolve legal disputes. However, the contested and varying political alliances in
Vermont, as well as a different developmental path (cf. Pierson 2004), led to a different
dispute resolution structure being codified into law. Unlike California, Vermont did not
create a court-based option for consumers in the 1970s. Thus, when Vermont created a
lemon law in the 1980s, Vermont considered both court and ADR options. In particular, different interest groups, namely, consumer advocates and automotive dealers,
dominated the Vermont legislative process. A political tradeoff ensued among key
stakeholders, such as automotive dealers, manufacturers, consumer advocates, and the
state attorney general, whereby a court option was eliminated from consideration in
return for permitting the State of Vermont to administer a dispute resolution structure
in addition to allowing the private dispute resolution process to operate. Thus, by
comparing two states that developed two different institutional processes with varying
degrees of business control and participation in the dispute resolution structures, I show
under what conditions business and managerial conceptions of law reshape the meaning
of public legal rights and the conditions under which they do not.

UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL STABILITY AND CHANGE
THROUGH HISTORICAL AND NEW INSTITUTIONAL THEORIES
New institutional organizational sociologists and political science historical institutionalists emphasize different mechanisms for explaining how institutions, legal or
otherwise, change or remain the same amid varying influence by organizations.3 After
reviewing historical and new institutional approaches, this section concludes by proposing an institutional-political framework that integrates both scholarly approaches
and offers broader explanatory power for explaining the puzzle of institutional change
and stability.
Historical institutionalists attempt to elucidate the role that institutions play in
the determination of the social and political world in which we live, that is, “formal or
informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational
structure of the polity or political economy” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938). Instead of
focusing on equilibria, historical institutionalists take a dynamic approach to history
and bring questions of timing and temporality into politics and, in particular, to the
center of the analysis of how institutions matter. They explain institutional development and stability by examining when events occur (Pierson 2000a, 2000b, 2004).
Historical institutionalists often highlight the importance of path dependencies, that is,
earlier decisions in time that often change the parameters and the decision making at
later points in time and make a particular course of action difficult to reverse (Pierson
3. Although empirical scholars increasingly focus on mechanism-centered causal explanations, the
term “mechanism” is somewhat ambiguous and contested (Gerring 2010). Gerring’s study “Causal Mechanisms: Yes, But . . .” highlights the wide-ranging definitions of the term “mechanism” and how the term is
often deployed by social science researchers without taking the time to define the term at all. When I use
the term mechanism in this article, I am referring to the pathways, processes, or micro-level explanations by
which an effect is produced.
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2000a, 2000b, 2004). Path dependency does not mean that institutions, government or
otherwise, cannot reverse their path, but that it is less likely to occur.
More recently, political scientists and some political sociologists are focusing on
how institutions change gradually over time and, in particular, the ways in which the
contradictory forces of institutional stability and change coexist (Weir 1992; Hall and
Taylor 1996; Clemens and Cook 1999; Thelen 1999, 2004; Schickler 2001; Hacker
2002, 2004, 2006; Streeck and Thelen 2004; Barnes 2007, 2008). Focusing on US
legislative and social policy, historical institutionalists identify three key modes of
institutional change. Instead of attacking legislation directly and seeking formal revision through explicit changes to laws, businesses and political elites adapt existing
institutions and policies to new ends (conversion), create new institutions or policies
without eliminating existing ones (layering), and change the operation or effect of
policies without significant changes in those policies’ structure (drift) (Schickler 2001;
Hacker 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2004; Thelen 2004; Hacker and Pierson 2010). Thus,
by examining processes unfolding over time and in relation to each other, historical
institutionalists highlight how business influence occurs within existing policy bounds,
through large-scale legislative reform, and through feedback loops between the litigation and legislative process in which elites participate (Hacker 2004; Barnes 2007,
2008, 2011).
These approaches toward history have strong explanatory power, especially with
respect to how businesses and policy elites influence legislative processes and public
policies; however, they are less specific about the processes and mechanisms through
which path dependency, conversion, or layering occurs (cf. Silverstein 2009). In other
words, historical institutionalists direct little attention toward the way that norms and
cultural practices that are developed and institutionalized by organizations affect which
institutions become path dependent and for what organizations choose to lobby. Moreover, they have not focused on how internal organizational processes, policies, and
structures (e.g., internal dispute resolution structures) eventually act as a form of
political power that leads to institutional change at the legislative level. Subterranean
forms of institutional change that surface via drift, conversion, and layering often
emerge from structures embedded within organizations.
On the other hand, new institutionalists focus less on timing and when events
occur to explain institutional change and stability. Instead, they focus on how widely
accepted norms, values, and patterns of behavior become taken for granted and institutionalized within organizational fields (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell
1983; Scott 1992, 2002). An organizational field is the subset of the environment that
is most closely relevant to a given organization, including suppliers, customers, and
competitors, as well as flows of influence, communication, and innovation (DiMaggio
and Powell 1983). New institutionalists focus on cultural or cognitive constructs that
engender and result in the proliferation of isomorphic or homogenous organizational
structures and forms, irrespective of those forms’ utility or appropriateness for a particular situation (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1992, 2002).
Although early accounts of organizational fields emphasize the uniformity, taken for
grantedness, and institutional isomorphism that results in a dominant or settled logic
within a field (Tolbert and Zucker 1983), more recently scholars are emphasizing that
fields often include multiple and contradictory logics (Friedland and Alford 1991;

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2585712

977

978 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY

Stryker 1994, 2000, 2002; Heimer 1999; Schneiberg 2002; Scott 2002; Lounsbury,
Ventresca, and Hirsch 2003; Schneiberg and Soule 2004; Edelman 2007, Talesh 2012,
2013).
Edelman and Stryker (2005) note that the concept of a legal field as a unit of
analysis is similar to the concept of an organizational field developed by new institutionalists in the 1970s. However, the key distinction is that each field anchors itself
around different core logics. The central logics of organizational fields in the United
States since the twentieth century are rationality and efficiency (Chandler 1962, 1977;
Scott and Davis 2007). Corporate governing models emphasizing formalization, rationalization, productivity, profit, managerial discretion, and survival permeate throughout
the United States in the form of administrative hierarchies within organizations
(Selznick 1969; Orloff and Skocpol 1984; Jacoby 1985; Baron, Dobbin, and Jennings
1986).
Conversely, the core logic of the legal field is anchored around rules and rights. In
particular, the “liberal legal model” holds that law is developed through adherence to
rational principles that produce a set of rulings that are impartial and free from political,
religious, and substantive influence. Thus, due process values and formal rules of
evidence recognized by the US legal system develop around the idea of impartiality. The
formal universality of rights in liberal legal ideology permits individuals to cement their
claims in those rights that can be recognized (if necessary using the court system) and
in the principles of social justice that underlie them.
Over the past forty years, a secondary and competing logic arose in the legal field
centered around ADR. Claims of “a litigation explosion” (Burger 1982, 275), “too
much law” (Galanter 2002, 296), and excessive use of adjudication to solve all problems reached their height in the 1970s and 1980s and prompted a series of experiments in alternative forums to resolve legal disputes (Lieberman 1983). As ADR rose
in the last three decades, organizations embraced these forums for inter- and
intraorganizational disputes (Westin and Feliu 1988). The rise of the ADR logic in the
legal field is anchored in the idea that by moving further away from formal procedural
rules and the constraints of precedent, informal and alternate forums provide greater
access and a disputing process that is faster, less expensive, less adversarial, more
empowering, more informal, private, and capable of producing flexible, creative solutions (Fisher and Ury 1981; Menkel-Meadow 1984; Westin and Feliu 1988; Bush
1989; Rosenberg 1991; Bush and Folger 1994; Lande 1998). Private organizations,
which also value efficiency and discretion, have come to embrace ADR as a primary
mode for resolving a variety of inter- and intraorganizational disputes (Talesh 2013).
Thus, legal practitioners, regulators, judges, legislators, organizations, and individuals
interact in a legal field with two distinct liberal legal and ADR logics regarding the
purpose of law and the use of legal processes. The overlap in both actors and institutions between organizational and legal fields provides an arena in which the ideas that
become institutionalized in organizational fields eventually seep into legal fields such
as courts (Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger 1999; Edelman et al. 2011) and legislatures
(Talesh 2009).
Unlike historical institutionalists, new institutionalists studying the relationship
between organizations and law focus less on (1) the role of politics and power, (2)
timing and temporality, and (3) how path-dependent events can trigger feedback
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mechanisms that reinforce the recurrence of a particular pattern in the future.4 Moreover, to date, new institutionalists have not engaged in a fine-grained analysis of
precisely how competing organizational and legal (liberal legal and ADR) field logics
influence the meaning of legislation. Although some political scientists and sociology
scholars have begun to tease out the relationship between institutionalized norms and
cognitive scripts (new institutionalist’s influence) and timing, political power, and
conflict (historical institutionalist’s emphasis) (Fligstein 1990; DiMaggio and Powell
1991; Stryker 1994, 2000, 2002; Katzenstein 1996; Stinchcombe 1997; Talesh 2009),
there has been little effort to bridge these two scholarly communities when studying
organizational influence over law (cf. Barnes and Burke 2006, 2012; Epp 2009; Talesh
2009). As Kathleen Thelen notes, “much work remains to be done to sort out the
relationship between the political (decision/power) and the cognitive (script) aspects of
institutional stability and change” (Thelen 1999, 387).
Rather than privileging social conditions over politics when studying institutional
change or examining institutional change solely within the boundaries of politics and
not social conditions, I explore how institutional and political mechanisms play a role
in shaping the meaning of consumer rights in California and Vermont. In doing so, I
develop an institutional-political framework that explains how California and Vermont
ended up with different institutional arrangements.
In this instance, organizations’ capacity to shape the content and meaning of law
in the legislative context results both when organizations create and institutionalize
dispute resolution venues within their organizational field and when organizations
directly engage in political mobilization and lobbying. By coding the legislative history
for liberal legal, ADR, and business logics, I show how the meaning of consumer rights
are shaped and transformed as liberal legal, ADR, and business logics are mobilized by
various interest groups and advocacy coalitions during the legislative process. As businesses legalize their environments by creating and institutionalizing dispute resolution
structures in their organizational field, business logics anchored in efficiency, discretion,
problem solving, and informality flow back into legislation by advocacy coalitions who
reframe the meaning of consumer protection for legislators. These logics diffused across
the country, as all fifty states adopted private dispute resolution structures into law.
However, while the entire country went down the path of layering these structures into
existing consumer lemon laws, local state politics explains why the form and control of
each structure was different in California and Vermont and, in particular, why Vermont
also adopted a state-run dispute resolution structure into law. Thus, my approach
enhances both historical and new institutional literatures. Diffusion and isomorphism
explain how path-dependent processes take shape. However, organizational conceptions of law, in particular, overlapping legal and organizational field logics, shape the
meaning of legislation in varying degrees due to path dependency and politics.

4. There are a few empirical studies suggesting politics matter when trying to understand organizational influence over law in other contexts such as securities regulation (Krawiec 2003, 2005; O’Brien 2007),
insurance regulation (Schneiberg 1999, 2005; Schneiberg and Bartley 2001), and consumer protection
(Talesh 2009). However, more work is needed by scholars interested in the relationship of business and legal
regulation.
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METHODOLOGY: ARCHIVAL ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE
RECORDS AND INTERVIEWS
To examine under what conditions organizations can influence the content and
meaning of social reform legislation, I obtained and analyzed approximately twenty-five
years of legislative history pertaining to California and Vermont’s consumer warranty
protection laws. I also conducted interviews with legislative analysts who drafted the
California and Vermont lemon laws. Interviewing the authors of various pieces of
legislation and tracing the legislative histories over time provided me the most direct
access to viable information that could reveal how California and Vermont’s lemon laws
were both similar yet different.
I chose these two states because they were each among the first states to enact
lemon laws using different models (California allowing private dispute resolution structures; Vermont using private and state-run dispute resolution structures).5 Because the
California legislature did not keep transcripts of oral testimony at legislative hearings
during the time period I reviewed, my inquiry consisted of written records. In Vermont,
I was able to acquire written records as well as cassette tapes of public hearings held
during legislative debate concerning the creation of its lemon law. These tapes were
subsequently transcribed and analyzed.
Once I collected my data, I combined two approaches sometimes used in studies
examining institutional change over time: process tracing (PT) and comparative analysis. My goal was to trace the sequence of events that caused California’s legislature to
codify manufacturers’ dispute resolution structures into its lemon law while Vermont’s
legislature codified both private and state-run disputing structures into law. Because I
was analyzing two states, my PT analysis was necessarily comparative and forced me to
identify factors that distinguish the differential outcomes. Drawing from prior historical
and new institutional work, my focus was on revealing the pathways, processes, or
micro-level explanations by which an effect is produced.

Legislative Documents
I located and obtained the entire universe of legislative documents available in
California and Vermont concerning (1) the initial creation of the California SongBeverly Act in 1971, the law that established warranty protection for consumers; (2)
the enactment of the California Lemon Law in 1982 and subsequent amendments
thereafter until 2006; and (3) the enactment of the Vermont Lemon Law in 1984 and
subsequent amendments thereafter until 2006. This inquiry produced approximately
1,900 pages of legislative history.
5. Obviously, California and Vermont are different in terms of size and ethnoracial composition.
Moreover, despite being generally considered liberal states, there certainly could be local or cultural
differences between California and Vermont. Evaluating possible qualitative differences among two states is
always an issue in comparative studies and exceedingly difficult to control for as a practical matter. Despite
these limitations, choosing two “first-mover” states, that is, California was the first to create a consumer
warranty law and the second to adopt private dispute resolution structures into law while Vermont was the
first state to also create a state-run dispute resolution structure, allowed me to maximize my opportunity to
collect the information as opposed to selecting states that ultimately followed national trends.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2585712

Institutional and Political Sources of Legislative Change

The legislative history contained a variety of documents that I content coded and
categorized into three areas: letters, legislative documents, and miscellaneous. There
were a variety of letters in the legislative history from many different groups, including,
but not limited to, manufacturers, legislators, governors, plaintiffs and defense lawyers,
consumers, consumer advocacy groups, manufacturer associations, and manufacturer
advocacy groups. These detailed letters provided a timeline and tremendous insight into
what each person’s or group’s position was concerning the relevant bill or proposal
before the legislature.6 The legislative documents included committee reports, amendments, voting records for some bills, legislative analyst reports from state senators and
staff, bill summaries, proposals, drafts of alternative bills and red-line revisions of
statutes, handwritten notes of legislators, and judicial, senate, and legislative committee
analysis. The miscellaneous documents consisted of press releases, newspaper articles,
interviews with legislators, reports from the federal government, and other documents
related to consumer warranty protection.
After my initial collection of all documents, I screened the documents to determine whether they were relevant to my study. Any documents pertaining to the
following four categories were considered relevant documents and therefore included
in my study: (1) lemon law field actors’ involvement in the creation of the SongBeverly Act; (2) the creation of the California Lemon Law in 1982; (3) the creation
of the Vermont Lemon Law in 1984; and (4) documents relating to either the establishment of a legal presumption or the creation of dispute resolution procedures. The
lemon laws enacted in the 1980s by California and Vermont were specifically enacted
to deal with warranty issues for new motor vehicles. My purpose was to identify and
closely examine the complete history of the creation and codification of private and
state-run dispute resolution procedures into lemon laws.7 I identified 538 pages of
relevant documents.
Once my initial screening of documents was complete, my coding scheme sought
to examine political and institutional logics that were dominating the legislative
process in both states. I coded my documents across a series of variables: (1) date,

6. Numerous manufacturers also provided their own reports concerning their private dispute resolution
forums to assist the legislature. The legislative history included General Motors’ position statements,
California Manufacturers’ issue statement, report, and editorial, California Automobile Dealers Association
letters, New Motor Vehicle Board letters, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association analysis, Ford Motor
Company’s release statement in opposition to the lemon law, problem papers, appeals board brochures,
charts, and proposed amendments.
7. The analysis in the following sections is derived from my review of the legislative history for the
following statutes and amending bills: Cal. Stat. 1970, ch. 1333, SB 272; Stat. 1971, ch. 1523, SB 742; Stat.
1972, ch. 1293, SB 685; Stat. 1976, ch. 416, SB 568; Stat. 1978, ch. 991, AB 3374; Stat. 1980, ch. 394, AB
2263; Stat. 1981, ch. 150, SB 282; Stat. 1982, ch. 381, AB 3561; Stat. 1982, ch. 388, AB 1787; Stat. 1986,
ch. 547, AB 3835; Stat. 1986, ch. 547, AB 3835; Stat. 1987, ch. 1280, AB 2057; Stat. 1988, ch. 697, AB
4513; Stat. 1989, ch. 193, AB 1104; Stat. 1991, ch. 689, AB 211; Stat. 1992, ch. 1232, SB 1762; Stat. 2002,
ch. 306, SB 1765; VT legislative bills H.0039, H.0537, S.0105, Bill File Copy 1983–84 (H.48). I also
reviewed and transcribed the following public hearing testimony provided to me by the Vermont legislative
archives: Senate Judiciary April 16, 1999, April 20, 1999, and April 21, 1999, Senate Highways & Traffic
Committee transcripts, April 6, 1984, April 9, 1984, April 14, 1984, and April 17, 1984; House Commerce
Committee transcripts January 8, 1988, January 28, 1988, February 9, 1988, and February 16, 1988.
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(2) state, (3) author, (4) document type, (5) bill number, and (6) summary of content.
I also coded documents to determine the absence or presence of business,8 ADR,9 and
liberal legal10 logics in the legislative discourse. The term “logic” refers to the way
organizations and individuals organize their thoughts and assumptions about meaning,
values, schemas, and culture (Friedland and Alford 1991). As previously discussed, what
constitutes a liberal legal, ADR, or business logic was derived from long-standing
literatures examining ADR (Moore 1986; Fisher and Ury 1981; Menkel-Meadow 1984;
Galanter and Lande 1992), liberal legal logic (Kennedy 1980; Tushnet 1984; Bumiller
1987; Minow 1987; Freeman 1990; Schultz 1990; Williams 1991; Edelman 1992), and
business logic (Selznick 1969; Orloff and Skocpol 1984; Jacoby 1985; Baron, Dobbin,
and Jennings 1986; Edelman 2007) as well as previous empirical studies in which lemon
law field actors were interviewed and asked to identify the purposes and goals of dispute
resolution and lemon laws (Talesh 2012). While the majority of specific business values
I used were derived from prior literature, I added customer satisfaction into the coding
scheme after preliminary coding revealed that customer satisfaction was a frame being
offered by private actors in a large number of documents. Thus, customer satisfaction
was added into the coding scheme and coded for throughout all documents in the
dataset.
First, I determined whether each document explicitly discussed or mentioned
liberal legal, ADR, or business logics (0 = No, 1 = Yes). These categories were not
mutually exclusive. A document could, for example, reflect both ADR and business
logics. To the extent that a document reflected a presence of a liberal legal, ADR, or
business logic, I then coded for the absence or presence of subsets within each liberal
legal, ADR, or business logic category. Table 1 summarizes the logics that I coded for in
the legislative discourse
These specific subcategories for business, ADR, and liberal legal logics were also
not mutually exclusive. A document could, for example, reflect both ADR and business
logics. A document could also reflect multiple ADR, business, or liberal legal logics in
the same document (e.g., productivity, efficiency, informality, and quickness). The
presence of a particular logic in a document, however, was coded only once. For
example, a document having multiple or repeated statements reflecting or indicating
the presence of the ADR value “informality” was coded for the presence of informality
one time for that document. Examples of language from the legislative history that was
coded as reflecting a specific liberal legal, ADR, or business logic can be found in

8. A business logic was defined in my codebook as “a statement that reflects core business values and
orientations, including profit, efficiency, productivity, customer satisfaction, and managerial discretion.”
9. An ADR logic was defined in my codebook as “a statement that reflects an affirmation and affinity
for resolving disputes outside of courts, or reflects a belief in resolving conflicts quickly, informally, privately,
saving costs, and often with a flexible, problem-solving orientation that focuses on interests, needs, and
problems as opposed to formal legal rights.”
10. A liberal legal logic was defined in my codebook as “a statement reflecting an affirmation and/or
affinity for protecting formal legal rights of individuals, equality, justice, and formal rules of evidence and
procedure. It also reflects a general belief that using the court (or publicly transparent) system is the most
appropriate domain to achieve liberal legal values.”
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TABLE 1.
Logics Coded for in Legislative Discourse of California and Vermonta
Liberal Legal Logic

Protecting formal rights of
individual
Formal rules of evidence
Due process (notice, right to
counsel, opportunity to be
heard, neutral decision
maker)
Court system (as preferred
venue to protect rights)
Other

ADR Logic

Business Logic

Quickness (resolve disputes
quickly)
Informality (resolve disputes
informally)
Privacy (case resolved outside
courts)

Profit (organization’s desire to
increase revenue)
Efficiency/efficient management
(keep costs down)
Productivity (solve problems, task
oriented)

Saving costs

Managerial discretion and control
(over organizational decisions)
Customer satisfaction (desire to
keep customers happy)

Flexibility (extralegal remedies,
flexible solutions)

a
As I mentioned earlier, I was forced to adjust my coding scheme in Vermont slightly because
significant portions of the Vermont legislative record contained transcripts of oral testimony at public
hearings before the legislature. In Vermont, I treated each speaker as a “document” for purposes of coding
and coded each speaker’s testimony for all the variables in my coding scheme.
Note: Table 1 highlights the various logics that were coded for in the legislative records of California
and Vermont. These categories are not mutually exclusive. A document could, for example, reflect both
ADR and business logics.

Appendices 1, 2, and 3. Subsequent reliability checks of the coding showed no systematic discrepancy and reliability was above the acceptable standard.11
Once coding was complete, I evaluated the raw number, percentage, and proportion of representation of values annually and aggregately over the twenty-five-year time
period. The absence and presence of various liberal legal, ADR, and business logics were
evaluated over time by author, document type, bill number, state, relevance, and
specific logics invoked. My quantitative coding allowed me to evaluate the change in
the legislative discourse over time, the prevalence of logics in the legislative discourse,
and the variation in which interest groups were mobilizing various logics in California
and Vermont. In addition to quantitative coding, each document was coded for

11. Although content-based coding categories tend to be more interpretive and require considerable
judgment to apply (Krippendorff 1980, 62–63), reliability was assessed by recoding by two research assistants
of a subsample of the documents and evaluated using Cohen’s kappa. The kappa statistic is generally
considered one of the best measures of agreement available because, unlike other measures, it explicitly takes
into account the level of agreement between raters that may be expected simply by chance. Kappa has a value
of 0 when the level of agreement is what would be expected by chance and 1 when there is perfect agreement.
Usually, the value of kappa falls somewhere in between. After completing training, the research assistants
practiced coding documents that had already been coded by the principal investigator. The research assistants
did not begin actual coding until they could accurately and consistently reproduce the coding of previously
coded documents. Kappa scores reflecting level of agreement among coders of the presence of liberal legal,
ADR, and business logics as well as the specific subcategories among each respective logic exceed .90 for
sixteen of the twenty-three indicators and exceed .80 for seven of the twenty-three indicators. These
indicators suggest reliability in the coding well above required levels (Clayman et al. 2007).
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substantive content and analyzed using PT methods (George and Bennett 2005;
Bennett and Elman 2006).
In sum, my comparative PT approach explored whether and how politics and
institutional logics influenced the legislative process in both states. This research
approach, however, suffers from a long-standing limitation to archival research: it is
always possible that the legislative archives do not contain all the actual documents
pertaining to the creation and development of these lemon laws. While it is always
possible my dataset is missing documents or that other relevant documents exist, I
obtained and evaluated every written and audio file made available by California and
Vermont’s legislative archives from the time period of my study.

Interviews
The quantitative coding and qualitative content analyses were supplemented with
in-depth interviews with legislative analysts who were involved in drafting the California
and Vermont lemon laws. I identified which individuals to interview by making a list of
the legislative analysts who appeared in the legislative record as drafters of various bills.
Based on the legislative records in both states, there were seven primary drafters of the
Song-Beverly Act and California and Vermont lemon laws. I invited these individuals to
be interview subjects in my study. Four individuals agreed to conduct in-depth interviews.
I interviewed one of the authors of the Song-Beverly Act, two individuals involved with
drafting the California Lemon Law, and the legislative analyst who drafted the Vermont
Lemon Law. In-depth interviews with the actual drafters of these lemon laws provided
another opportunity to understand the processes through which these laws were created
and altered over time. Although retrospective interview data about events that took
place twenty-five to thirty-five years ago may not be reliable, these laws were clearly
salient to lawmakers, who reported that this legislation was among the most meaningful
and important work they did. In addition, interview data from both California and
Vermont largely corroborate my documentary data.

AN INSTITUTIONAL-POLITICAL EXPLANATION OF PRIVATE
ORGANIZATIONS’ INFLUENCE OVER THE MEANING OF SOCIAL
REFORM LEGISLATION
This section discusses the institutional and political mechanisms through which
automobile manufacturers shaped the content and meaning of California and Vermont
consumer protection laws. The diffusion or spreading of organizationally created dispute
resolution structures as lemon law field actors interact explains why California and
Vermont codified private dispute resolution structures into law. However, path dependency and politics explain why Vermont also adopted a state-run dispute resolution
process into law. My comparative analysis of California’s and Vermont’s legislative
history highlights how legislative advocates relied on liberal legal, ADR, and business
logics in various ways.
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The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act—Establishing Powerful
Rights for Consumers

Percentages

California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civil Code §§ 1790 et seq.)
(Song-Beverly Act or Act) was the first federal or state consumer warranty protection
statute passed in the United States. Enacted in 1971, the Act grew out of California
state investigations and public hearings in the late 1960s, which revealed that manufacturers and retailers rarely accepted responsibility for making repairs under their
warranties (Legislative Analyst, SR 3020, lines 81–122). The largest number of warranty complaints concerned automobile dealers and manufacturers.
California State Assembly Senator Alfred Song specifically indicated that the
purpose of creating a consumer warranty protection law was to eliminate delays and a
lack of accountability by manufacturers who issue warranties for their products and
provide consumers a pathway for seeking relief: “There is no effective remedy aside from
the courts. Certain private and government agencies collect complaints of shady business dealings, but they will not act to reimburse the customer. . . . Filing suit in court is
the best alternative for the consumer” (Song press release November 1969). My coding
of the legislative record confirms that liberal legal values and, in particular, a rightsbased rhetoric dominated the discourse at the legislative level during the creation of
California’s Song-Beverly Act. Figure 1 demonstrates that of the documents coded as
relevant during the creation of the Song-Beverly Act, 83 percent had the presence of a
liberal legal value.
Of note, there was no presence of any discourse concerning ADR in the legislative
record from 1969 to 1971. The legislative record also revealed an overwhelming focus
on rights-based rhetoric. Song repeatedly indicated that when defects emerged under
warranty, consumers should have “the legal right to have it repaired or replaced.”
Figure 2 reveals that of the liberal legal values present in the legislative discourse, rights
frames were prevalent 95 percent of the time.
100%
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FIGURE 1.
Presence of values in legislative record during creation of Song-Beverly Act (1969–
1971).
Note: Figure 1 highlights, by percentage of documents in the legislative record, the
presence of liberal legal, ADR, and business values during the creation of the
Song-Beverly Act.
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FIGURE 2.
Specific liberal legal values invoked in the legislative discourse (1969–1971).
Note: Figure 2 highlights, by percentage of documents in the legislative record, the
presence of specific liberal legal values during the creation of the Song-Beverly Act.
The Act set forth rights, responsibilities, and the legal relationship of buyers and
sellers of consumer goods in California. If manufacturers issuing express warranties for
consumer goods sold in California were unable to service or repair consumer goods to
conform to the applicable express warranties after being given a “reasonable number of
attempts” to fix the problem, consumers could go to court and seek full reimbursement
(refund) or a replacement vehicle. In addition, consumers could seek a civil penalty up
to two times the actual damages plus attorney fees.
Not surprisingly, consumers strongly supported the bill while manufacturers argued
that the law was ambiguous, poorly drafted, and would lead to increased litigation.
Automotive dealers also were allies of the proposed law since they were not going to be
held liable:
We found a common interest here because the retailers were annoyed by the
manufacturers’ policy on warranties, too, because their customers would purchase
products that proved to be defective and take them back to the retailer, saying this
was covered by warranty, but the manufacturers weren’t reimbursing the retailers.
(Legislative Analyst, SR 2030, lines 125–38)
The Song-Beverly Act was a significant victory for consumers.12 Rights-based
rhetoric dominated the legislative discourse as consumer organizations pressed for strong
social reform legislation forcing manufacturers to enforce warranties issued. However, all

12. The federal government soon followed California’s lead as the problem regarding warranties was
not limited to California. The federal government’s office for consumer affairs noted that it was receiving
more than 4,000 letters a month from consumers across the country in the late 1960s and early 1970s
concerning manufacturers’ failure to uphold their warranties. The 1975 Federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act (Magnuson-Moss Act) passed, setting forth minimum requirements for those who chose to issue full
warranties.
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involved realized ambiguities in the law could create unforeseenchallenges. In particular,
the Act did not define what constitutes a reasonable number of attempts or a civil penalty.

Manufacturers’ Transformation of California Consumer Rights Through the
Creation of Private Dispute Resolution Processes
California State Assembly Committee hearings in the late 1970s revealed that
consumers remained frustrated with manufacturers. As a result, full restitution or
replacement of new automobiles rarely occurred because manufacturers rarely acknowledged that they were given a reasonable number of attempts to fix a defect under
warranty (Assem. Com. Report 1980, 1981).
In 1980, California Assemblywoman Sally Tanner decided to clarify and expand the
Song-Beverly Act by proposing a specific law, referred to as the California “Lemon Law,”
which defined what constitutes a “reasonable number of attempts” for new motor
vehicles. Because automobiles were the primary source of complaints from consumers,
Tanner felt that it was necessary to strengthen the protection afforded consumers. The
bill proposed that a consumer could invoke a “legal presumption” that the automobile
manufacturer had been legally given a reasonable number of attempts to repair a
nonconformity if (1) the same nonconformity had been subject to repairs by the
manufacturer or its agents four or more times or (2) the new motor vehicle had been out
of service by reason of repair for a cumulative total of twenty days or more.
Domestic and foreign automobile manufacturers strongly objected to the lemon
law and lobbied against the proposal. They alerted Tanner and the rest of the legislature
through letters and detailed memoranda that, in response to the Song-Beverly Act’s
passage in 1971, automobile manufacturers had created internal dispute resolution
processes to resolve consumer disputes. Consistent with the predictions of new institutional studies (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Edelman 1990, 1992; Dobbin and Sutton
1998), diffusion of dispute resolution structures among manufacturers and dealers
occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition to foreign and US automobile manufacturers, over 2,000 automotive dealers across the United States jointly funded and
controlled a third-party dispute resolution process to resolve warranty complaints. With
some variation, these dispute resolution processes consisted of panels of three to five
persons, often including manufacturer and dealer representatives, a mechanic, and a
consumer advocate. Eventually, manufacturers contracted with third-party dispute resolution organizations to administer these programs.
Whereas rights-based claims dominated the discourse during the Song-Beverly
Act’s creation, Figure 3 shows a convergence in the presence of liberal legal, ADR, and
business values in the legislative discourse in the early 1980s.
In particular, manufacturer advocacy to the California legislature was uniform. Led
by Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler, manufacturers without exception framed the
purpose and benefits of their dispute resolution processes in terms of legitimacy, efficiency, cost savings, discretion, informality, and customer satisfaction as opposed to
consumer protection. Unlike the predominantly rights-based rhetoric present in the
legislative record in 1971, Figures 4 and 5 reveal a broad cross-section of multiple ADR
and business values present in the legislative discourse between 1980 and 1982.
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FIGURE 3.
Convergence in values in Californian legislative discourse (1969–1982).
Note: Figure 3 highlights, by percentage of documents in the legislative record, the
change in the legislative discourse from 1969 to 1982.
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FIGURE 4.
Specific ADR values invoked in Californian legislative discourse (1980–1982).
Note: Figure 4 highlights, by percentage of documents in the legislative record, the
presence of specific ADR values invoked during legislative discourse concerning the
California Lemon Law.
Manufacturers simultaneously mobilized ADR and business values while lobbying
the legislature. For example, Ford emphasized that it had “taken great strides in establishing a speedy, inexpensive, and fair system to resolve product disputes as an effective
alternative to lengthy and costly dependence on the courts” (Ford Release). Chrysler
indicated that it had created and funded a third-party dispute resolution forum because
it “can’t afford any dissatisfied purchasers” and because it was “a far better way, and
certainly less costly in time and money to the car owner, to get a satisfactory resolution
to the problem of the so-called ‘Lemon’ car than the long-drawn out method embodied
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FIGURE 5.
Specific business values invoked in the Californian legislative discourse (1980–
1982).
Note: Figure 5 highlights, by percentage of documents in the legislative record, the
presence of specific business values invoked during legislative discourse concerning
the California Lemon Law.
in AB 1787 [Lemon Law]” (A.E.D letter, Aug. 7, 1981; see Appendices 2 and 3). Full
restitution in these processes, however, remained rare.
Consistent with prior new institutional studies (Edelman, Erlanger, and Lande
1993), internal dispute resolution processes provided a means through which manufacturers’ values and norms influenced the structure and content of the lemon law field far
more than did consumers’ interests. Moreover, manufacturers formed advocacy coalitions with other interested stakeholders such as third-party dispute resolution administrators that influenced public policy. By linking their private dispute resolution
structures to other socially recognized values such as informality and efficiency, manufacturers redefined consumer rights.13 This resulted in a shift in the discourse about the
Song-Beverly Act that reflected the advocacy efforts of business.

The Legislature Layers Manufacturer Dispute Resolution Processes into the
California Lemon Law
After the California Lemon Law was narrowly defeated in 1980 and 1981, the
Lemon Law, Civil Code § 1793.22, was enacted in 1982, but with major changes from
13. In this instance, a pure rational choice account of manufacturers’ response is unlikely to explain
manufacturers’ actions fully. It is important to note that the field of manufacturers and dealers developed
private dispute resolution structures in the 1970s even though manufacturers were not excessively at risk of
repurchasing cars. Between 1970 and 1980, the legislative history indicates that manufacturers rarely
repurchased consumers’ automobiles because they claimed they had not been given a reasonable number of
attempts to repair them and that this provision was not defined in the Song-Beverly Act. However,
manufacturers created these structures anyway because they were concerned about other business values such
as exuding legitimacy, being responsive to consumers, and creating informal forums to resolve problems (cf.
Edelman, Abraham, and Erlanger 1992). Interviews with manufacturers and other stakeholders involved in
creating and administering these dispute resolution programs confirm that they were primarily concerned with
creating an informal, flexible, relatively quick process that could solve the consumer’s problem (Talesh 2012).
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the original proposal. Under the Lemon Law, a consumer was entitled to a “legal
presumption” that the manufacturer received a “reasonable number of attempts” if the
manufacturer had been given four or more chances to fix the defect within the first 12,000
miles or twelve months from purchase or the automobile had been out of service by
reason of repair for a cumulative total of more than thirty (not twenty) calendar days
within the first 12,000 miles or twelve months from purchase. A manufacturer was
permitted to rebut the presumption at trial by showing that its actions in a particular
case were reasonable.
The most important changes, however, concerned the California legislature’s
layering of manufacturers’ dispute resolution processes into the Lemon Law. Specifically,
the legal presumption as to what constitutes a “reasonable number of attempts”—the
main purpose of the Lemon Law—could not be asserted in court unless the consumer
first resorted to the existing “qualified third-party dispute resolution process” to the
extent a manufacturer maintained one (Civil Code § 1793.22(c)). Thus, legal protections afforded under the Lemon Law were contingent upon using manufacturers’ thirdparty dispute resolution processes if they existed. Dispute resolution processes
“qualified” if they met the minimum requirements set forth in the federal warranty law,
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and, in particular, Federal Trade Commission Rule
703, for dispute resolution proceedings.14 Decisions under dispute resolution processes
were binding on manufacturers but not consumers. In a display of deference to
manufacturer-sponsored venues, the Lemon Law indicates that if the consumer chose to
reject the arbitrator’s ruling and sue, the arbitrator’s findings could be admitted at trial
without any need for evidentiary foundation. Unlike remedies available in court, the
Lemon Law also provided that no civil penalties or attorney fees could be recovered in
dispute resolution processes unless the manufacturer-run program permits such recovery.
Further, unlike the all (restitution, replacement) or nothing (no award) remedies
available in court, arbitrators are permitted to award consumers the opportunity to
allow manufacturers another repair attempt.
In sum, institutional and political theories explain how strong public legal rights
were channeled into alternative forums. Consistent with historical institutional theories
of path dependency (Pierson 2000a, 2000b, 2004), California established in 1971 a
litigation path for resolving consumer disputes by creating a private right of action
attainable in court. Manufacturers responded both to environmental demands (changes
in public attitudes and awareness, the law, legal mandates) and to managerial interests
(desire for fewer lawsuits, greater efficiency, informality, quick resolution, and no civil
penalties or attorney fees) by developing private dispute resolution venues to satisfy
legitimacy and efficiency concerns. One by one, manufacturers and dealers created
various dispute resolution structures until this approach became the institutionalized
norm in the lemon law field. Manufacturers eventually contracted with external
14. The federal Magnuson-Moss Act set forth minimum requirements for manufacturers that chose to
issue full warranties. Specifically, the FTC regulation Rule 703 required manufacturers (1) to notify the buyer
about the existence, location, and method for using the dispute resolution program; (2) to fund the program;
(3) to insulate the program from manufacturer influence; (4) to make the program free to the consumer; and
(5) to require the program reach a decision within forty days. The Magnuson-Moss Act did not establish a
means of ensuring that these programs operated fairly and impartially. It also did not provide for civil
penalties.
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third-party organizations to administer lemon law programs and train individual arbitrators. When the legislature proposed creating a specific lemon law for automobile
warranties in the 1980s, business, ADR, and liberal legal frames simultaneously permeated the legislative discourse. Because California already had a litigation path in place for
consumers seeking relief, manufacturers instead used their creation of dispute resolution
venues to redefine and convert (cf. Hacker 2002, 2004; Barnes 2007, 2008) public rights
attainable in court into private rights to dispute resolution where fewer rights and
remedies are available for consumers. The legislature, without ever formally and critically
analyzing whether manufacturer institutional venues were procedurally and substantively fair to consumers, layered manufacturer venues into the Lemon Law (Streeck and
Thelen 2004; Barnes 2007, 2008). Thus, the norms regarding compliance that evolved
within the organizational field during the 1970s shaped manufacturers’ conceptions of
law in their lobbying behavior in the 1980s in the legal field (i.e., legislature).

Vermont Develops First State-Run Lemon Law Dispute Resolution Structure
California was the first state to create a warranty law and the second state to create
a law specifically protecting consumers who receive automobile warranties. California,
however, was not unique. Amid the rise of ADR structures beginning in the 1970s
(Galanter 2002), all fifty states began copying one another and developed lemon laws
in the early 1980s that permit third-party dispute resolution organizations to administer
lemon law cases on behalf of automobile manufacturers.15 However, Vermont was the
first of thirteen states also to create a state-run dispute resolution structure, albeit with
varying degrees of state and private involvement.16 While new institutional understandings of diffusion, institutional isomorphism, and organizational influence of law explain
why manufacturers uniformly developed these dispute resolution structures and why
states ultimately adopted them into law, these theories, in this instance, do not explain
the variation in the type of dispute resolution structure adopted by states.
Although all states deferred to ADR venues, political opportunity and path dependency shaped the manner and type of dispute resolution structure adopted into law by
Vermont. By the time California developed a specific lemon law dealing with automobile warranties in 1982, California already had a litigation option in place for consumers
through the creation of the Song-Beverly Act in 1970. Thus, the legislative debate over
California’s Lemon Law in the early 1980s focused not on eliminating the litigation
option, but on layering manufacturers’ processes into law and making consumer rights
contingent on using such structures (cf. Schickler 2001). Moreover, because automotive
dealers were not liable under the Song-Beverly Act, they played little role in the
creation of the California Lemon Law in 1982.
Unlike California, Vermont did not have a litigation option in place when it
decided to create a lemon law in the early 1980s. Vermont’s legislature originally
15. Thirty-three states make invoking the legal presumption in court contingent on first using the
manufacturer-sponsored dispute resolution structure if one exists.
16. Seven states use a three- to five-person arbitrator panel consisting of various interested representatives from the lemon law field. Four states directly hire and oversee a private organization that administers
lemon law disputes and two states use administrative law judges.
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proposed a bill similar to the Song-Beverly Act and the original California Lemon Law.
Following other states’ lead, Vermont’s bill initially proposed creating a consumer cause
of action in court when warranties were breached. The bill also included the potential
for civil penalties and attorney fees. However, unlike California, Vermont’s original bill
proposed that automotive dealers also be made potentially liable. Because automotive
dealers faced potential liability under the proposed Vermont Lemon Law, they had
different incentives to participate in the legislative process and, consequently, were very
active in lobbying the Vermont legislature.
In this instance, institutional and political mechanisms work together to explain
how Vermont ended up with an ADR system that was administered by the state while
California ended up with a private dispute resolution process. Figure 6 demonstrates
that, consistent with new institutional studies of diffusion (spreading of organizational
forms and structures), Vermont experienced a similar presence of liberal legal, ADR,
and business values in the legislative discourse to what California experienced in the
early 1980s.
The logics present in the legislative discourse were largely similar in both states;
however, the actors mobilizing these frames and the political tradeoffs available for
interest groups were different. Unlike in California, automotive dealers played a formidable role in shaping the legislative process in Vermont. Automotive dealers’ aggressive
lobbying centered around two issues. First, dealers argued they should not be held liable
since they were not the party who issues the warranty to the consumer. Second, in
accordance with the proliferation of dispute resolution structures in the automotive
industry taking place in the 1970s, dealers suggested expanding their dispute resolution
system (called Auto-Cap) to include warranty disputes instead of having these cases
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FIGURE 6.
California and Vermont lemon laws—similar presence of values in legislative record
(1980–1984).
Note: Figure 6 shows, by percentage of documents and oral testimony in the legislative record, that the presence of business and ADR values was nearly equal during
the creation of California and Vermont lemon laws. This is consistent with new
institutional understandings of diffusion of institutionalized logics in an organizational field.
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sent to court: “We ought to take the auto bill of rights and our Auto-Cap program and
expand on that to cover the lemons and it won’t cost the taxpayers anything” (Auto.
Dealer Testimony, 1144). The Auto-Cap dispute resolution panel consisted of a board
of multiple industry representatives, a technical expert, and a consumer advocate.
Interviews with legislative analysts involved in the law-making process at the time
confirm that automotive dealers, in addition to consumers and consumer advocates,
aggressively lobbied the Vermont legislature.
My analysis of the legislative history confirms that automotive dealers, consumers,
and consumer advocates had a greater presence in the legislative discourse in Vermont
than California. Whereas automotive dealers had zero presence in the legislative record
concerning California’s Lemon Law, Figure 7 and Table 2 reveal that automobile
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FIGURE 7.
Difference in presence of interest groups in California and Vermont.
Note: Figure 7 highlights, by percentage of documents and/or oral testimony in the
legislative record, the difference in actors involved in the legislative discourse in
California and Vermont during the creation of their lemon laws.
TABLE 2.
Interest Group Presence in Legislative Discourse Over California and Vermont
Lemon Laws

Manufacturer
Dealer
Private industry advocate
Consumer
Consumer advocate
Journalista
Legislator

CA
(# of Docs.
Authored)
N = 120

26
0
17
4
10
30
33

CA
(%)

VT
(# of People Testifying
in Public Hearings)
N = 56

VT
(%)

22
0
14
3
8
25
27

4
12
4
11
8
0
17

7
21
7
20
14
0
30

a

Unlike California, Vermont’s legislative history did not include any newspaper or media articles.
Therefore, there are no journalistic accounts in the legislative record concerning the Vermont Lemon Law.
Note: Bold means included in Figure 7.
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dealers accounted for one-fifth of the lobbying done at the Vermont legislature during
public hearings. The presence of consumer advocates and consumer voice in the
legislative debate is collectively three times higher in Vermont than California. Conversely, manufacturer presence in the legislative record is approximately three times less
in Vermont than in California.
Legislative hearing testimony concerning the Vermont Lemon Law revealed broad
consensus among automotive dealers, manufacturers, consumer advocates, and the state
attorney general’s office for an ADR structure. They collectively argued that the cost,
delay, and expense of the civil litigation system was problematic for consumers and that
a court option was not necessary. However, while sympathetic to the problems of the
court system, consumer advocates, the state attorney general, and many legislators
remained skeptical about allowing private dispute resolution systems complete control
over adjudicating public legal rights. The different voices in the legislative debate
ultimately led to a different political compromise in Vermont, one that allowed dealer
and consumer interests to align around eliminating a court option but using a state-run
dispute resolution structure. Legislative representative John Zampieri highlights the
political compromise that took place in Vermont:
We had 44 people or thereabouts testify, both manufacturers, dealers, and consumers. After the hearing we decided that the bill that was presented to us had to
be rewritten if we were going to do anything on the subject. So, we went to work
and what we believe you’ve got is a pro-dealer, pro-consumer bill and probably
somewhat anti-manufacturer in that we believe that this gives the dealer more of
a handle in dealing with the manufacturers in the event that they have an
automobile that is technically not working very well and they’re having problems
getting service out of the manufacturer or its designees.
Because what we have done in this bill is that we have taken the Auto-Cap
program which is volunteer, we put it into statute form, we created a Vermont
motor vehicle arbitration board. . . .
If you go to that board and the decision that’s made by that board is on your side,
the manufacturer has got to live with it. Or, if the decision comes down against
you, you have to live with it. There is no appeal to the superior court unless you
can prove that there’s been collusion or hanky panky on that board or if the board
itself has violated some of the rules that it’s supposed to operate under. This will
preclude people from getting involved in a lengthy court fight and that decisions
will be done immediately after the case is heard before the board. . . . It’s a
quasi-judicial board. (Hearing Testimony, State Rep. John Zampieri Testimony,
March 29 1984)
It appears manufacturers were initially prepared to fight for favorable legislation in
Vermont, as they were in California. Manufacturers argued that their dispute resolution
systems sufficiently addressed consumer grievances. However, once the Vermont legislature proposed to keep these disputes outside courts and in a state-run dispute resolution structure that does not offer consumers the ability to recover attorney fees and civil
penalties, manufacturers opposed the bill less aggressively:
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This is one final decision. [Manufacturers] like this part. Because once the decision
is made, they can’t be brought into court and have a court case go indefinitely. The
decision is quick and final. (Hearing Testimony, State Rep. John Zampieri, March
29, 1984)
[Manufacturers] went berserk on the initial draft. They were ready to load bombs
in their planes and fly up here. The manufacturers know about this bill the way it
is written [now] and they’re not here. We’ve sent copies to them. . . . Apparently
they’re not upset about it the way that it’s set up. (Hearing Testimony, Tom
Heilman, Vermont Automotive Trade Association, April 4, 1984)
Amid the political tradeoffs between legislators, manufacturers, automotive
dealers, consumers, consumer advocates, and the state attorney general, Vermont in
1984 enacted a lemon law that grafted automotive dealers’ Auto-Cap dispute resolution
program into law but made changes to the board composition and who administers the
program. Instead of ceding the adjudicatory structure to private organizations, consumers making lemon law claims are allowed to choose between using the dispute resolution
structures manufacturers fund or the Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board (Lemon Law
Board) designed, funded, and run by the state government. Unlike the single-arbitrator
system in California, the Lemon Law Board consists of a five-person panel of arbitrators
appointed by the governor that hears lemon law cases twice a month in a government
building. Unlike Auto-Cap, the Lemon Law Board consists of three citizens, an automotive dealer representative, and a technical expert. The Lemon Law Board hears and
decides cases and the court administrator writes the legal decision. Other than appealing for abuse of discretion, there is no right to sue in court. The only remedies the
Lemon Law Board may award are restitution, replacement, or denial, that is, no additional remedies such as repair or reimbursement for expenses. There are also no attorney
fees or civil penalties in this forum. Thus, the creation of the Vermont Lemon Law
Board centered around a collective institutionalized belief that ADR forums are the
appropriate forum for these consumer disputes but that the dispute resolution structure
should be held in a public forum.
Table 3 highlights the major differences between California and Vermont’s dispute
resolution models.
In the lemon law context, new institutional studies and theories of political action
together explain how private organizations shaped the meaning of public legal rights in
different ways. Consistent with the predictions of new institutional studies, organizational structures that diffused among manufacturers and automotive dealers in the
lemon law field were adopted into law in California and Vermont, one run by private
organizations and the other run by the state. However, political science theories on path
dependency and interest group politics explain why the form of the dispute resolution
structure varied. Because California already had established a litigation path in the
1970s, it simply layered an additional structure into law in the 1980s (Pierson 2004).
However, Vermont had not already established a litigation path for lemon law
disputes. Thus, unlike California, Vermont considered all dispute resolution options,
including courts, when establishing its lemon law in 1984. In addition, the legislative
record confirms different voices permeated the legislative debate in Vermont and led to
different political tradeoffs: automotive dealers yielded on demanding that their dispute
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TABLE 3.
Lemon Law Dispute Resolution Structures

Location
Program administrator
Adjudicatory structure

Remedies available

Adjudicatory authority

Private

State-Run

Dispute Resolution Funded by Auto
Manufacturers

Dispute Resolution Arbitration
Board

California
Private third-party administrators
contract with manufacturers
1 arbitrator (lawyer or nonlawyer)

Full refund
Replacement car
Extralegal awards (repair,
reimbursement for expense)
Binding if consumer accepts decision;
otherwise can sue in court

Vermont
State administrator
5-person panel of arbitrators (3
citizens, 1 technical expert,
and 1 auto dealer)a
Full refund
Replacement car

Binding on both parties
(no right to sue in court)

a

Some states have three-person as opposed to five-person panels.

resolution process be used provided they were not going to be held liable under the new
law; the state attorney general, consumer advocates, and consumers withdrew support
for a court option in return for grafting automotive dealer’s private Auto-Cap dispute
resolution program into a public forum run and administered by the state; and manufacturers withdrew opposition to a dispute resolution forum other than their own in
exchange for removing a court option for consumers. Thus, institutional and political
mechanisms together explain how and under what conditions private organizations are
able to shape the content and meaning of public legal rights.
Other than strengthening administrative rules and procedures and altering the
eligibility, definitions, and statute of limitations, the Vermont legislature has made few
changes to the Vermont Lemon Law since its creation. The Vermont legislature is
largely content allowing a state-run disputing structure to adjudicate consumer lemon
law grievances. Legislative amendments to the California Lemon Law primarily focused
on ways of establishing soft state certification and approval of the third-party dispute
resolution processes. Despite these efforts, as I mentioned earlier, prior studies show
consumers won refunds or replacements far less in California than in Vermont from
1996–2007 (Talesh 2012). Thus, while this study does not attempt to make causal
claims, the legislative process and, in particular, the institutional design of these processes, may matter in terms of who wins in these forums.

THEORY, METHODOLOGICAL, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This article makes several theoretical, methodological, and policy contributions to
the study of organizations and law. By integrating historical and new institutional
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approaches, my “institutional-political” theoretical framework brings together two
scholarly communities that explore the puzzle of institutional change and stability but
rarely speak directly to one another when examining organizational influence over law.
On the one hand, consistent with new institutional studies of diffusion of institutionalized structures within organizational fields, virtually all automotive manufacturers and
dealers created dispute resolution systems in response to social and legal pressures. As
these dispute resolution structures became institutionalized, California and Vermont
eventually adopted these structures into their lemon laws. Though beyond the empirical scope of this article, it is important to note that the rest of the states immediately
followed California and other early-mover states in the mid-1980s and made consumer
rights in their lemon laws contingent on using private dispute resolution structures.
Thus, in the lemon law context, we see diffusion of private dispute resolution structures
among automotive manufacturers and dealers and also diffusion of the form in state
lemon laws’ incorporation of these private structures into their lemon laws. The legislative process became an important domain for importing ideas from the organizational
field into the legal field. The legislature’s perceptions of manufacturer dispute resolution
structures as efficient and the proper forum for these conflicts was culturally conditioned
around manufacturers’ norms and beliefs that private dispute resolution was the appropriate mechanism for conflict resolution. Thus, organizational influence over the
meaning of social reform legislation results from institutional legal meaning making in
the organizational field, namely, diffusion, isomorphism, and overlapping organizational
and legal field logics.
On the other hand, politics and path dependency also impact the legislative
process. Although institutionalized logics concerning the value of alternative disputing
forums shaped what advocacy coalitions chose to lobby for and ultimately diffused into
Vermont law as well, the different political alliances in Vermont, and the fact that
Vermont had not already established a litigation option for consumers, led to a state-run
dispute resolution structure also being codified into law. While prior work on path
dependency reveals how businesses and policy elites influence legislative processes and
public policies, my study shows how internal organizational processes, policies, and
structures (e.g., private dispute resolution structures) can eventually act as a form of
political power that leads to institutional change at the legislative level. Whereas prior
work places less emphasis on the processes through which subterranean forms of institutional change such as path dependency, conversion, or layering occurs (cf. Silverstein
2009), I reveal how norms and cultural practices that are developed and institutionalized by organizations can affect which institutions become path dependent and for what
organizations choose to lobby. In this instance, the alteration of these lemon laws
emerged from structures embedded within organizations.
My methodological approach also enhances existing approaches concerning studying law and organizations. Comparing cases using PT analysis reveals the political and
institutional mechanisms driving legislative stability and change across states. Simultaneous qualitative content and quantitative coding analysis of the legislative history
across a series of business, ADR, and liberal legal values provides a novel way for
studying how overlapping organizational and legal field logics can bring about institutional change that accounts for norms, values, and cognitive scripts as well as the power
of politics and political action. My study, therefore, responds to the growing call by
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institutionalists across disciplines for “greater interchange among [institutional theories]” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 955) and “specifying more precisely the reproduction and
feedback mechanisms on which particular institutions rest” (Thelen 1999, 400). At a
minimum, my comparative PT analysis hopefully provides some evidence that, at least
for those interested in studying the relationship between organizations and law, we can
enhance our understanding by blending historical and institutional schools of thought.
From a policy standpoint, these data raise important questions concerning the
conditions under which social reform legislation is likely to facilitate or inhibit consumer inequality in society. Whereas prior sociolegal empirical research primarily
focuses on the perceived success or failure of social reform legislation, my analysis
demonstrates how organizational influence over the content and meaning of legislation and, more precisely, the institutional design of social reform laws, impacts
whether legislation is likely to reduce the imbalance of power between consumers and
manufacturers.
California’s consumer protection laws enacted in the 1970s and 1980s intended to
limit manufacturers’ ability to perpetuate social and economic advantage through the
manufacturer-consumer relationship. Although the Song-Beverly Act and the Lemon
Law altered the legal environment by changing public perceptions and attitudes about
consumer entitlement and rights, the ambiguity of these laws gave manufacturers wide
latitude to construct their legal environment. Thus, the evolution of California’s consumer warranty laws reveals that even in situations where one would most expect law
to protect the one-shot player, that is, cases arising under a remedial statute granting
individual rights, there are subtle ways by which statutes can be weakened (cf. Albiston
1999). In this instance, organizational advocacy and involvement in social reform
legislation in California was not balanced with competing voices and values and,
consequently, increased manufacturers’ ability to co-opt legislation. The legislative
history of Vermont’s Lemon Law highlights the circumstances under which businesses
are less successful in shaping the meaning of law among core public legal institutions
and, in particular, how politics and varying political alliances matter. Scholars interested in continuing to examine the vitality of social reform legislation would be well
served not just to study federal laws, but also to compare the variation in state social
reform laws (cf. Burke and Barnes 2009).
My comparative approach also complements critical legal studies scholars’ work on
how law can be an instrument of power to increase racial, gender, and class inequality
by showing under what conditions legislative deference to organizational structures
leads to legal inequality. To the extent consumer protection laws are undermined by
business norms in various private disputing forums deferred to by public legal institutions, policies may be ineffective, especially in ameliorating social and economic disadvantages for consumers. How social reform laws are designed can increase or decrease
the likelihood of achieving a statute’s desired goals. Given that consumer and civil
rights claims are increasingly being directed into organizational forums with legislative
and judicial deference, future studies should focus not just on whether consumers
prevail in these adjudicatory settings, but also how these institutional forms are developed and designed. Understanding the conditions under which businesses are able to
influence the content of legislation will allow more sophisticated policy design and
more informed legislative and judicial decisions.
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APPENDICES
The following three appendices highlight some examples of language from the
legislative history that was coded as reflecting a specific liberal legal, ADR, or business
logic. A single document could reflect multiple ADR, business, or liberal legal logics. I
provide examples from a variety of documents analyzed as part of a legislative record.
However, a few of the examples provided below demonstrate how a single document in
the legislative record could be coded for more than one logic.
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Appendix 1
Liberal Legal Logic

Protecting formal
rights of
individual

Court system (as
preferred venue
to protect rights)
Formal rules of
evidence

Due process
(notice, right to
counsel,
opportunity to
be heard, neutral
decision maker)

Example

1. “The law in this field, however, is not clear, and the litigant must take
his chances. The rights and responsibilities of the manufacturer, the
retailer and the consumer should be well-defined and known to all
parties. I plan to introduce legislation on this subject next year.”
[Legislative Press Release quoting Song]
2. “Last year I was able to enact the SB Consumer Warranty Act which
does give consumers legal weapons to enforce the provisions of
warranties on products purchased after March 1, 1971.” [Letter, Alfred
Song, 1971]
3. “We, the elected representatives, are vested with the responsibility of
protecting the public’s interest. . . . There are no laws in California
specifically designed to protect the consumer. This bill is a step in the
right direction.” [Quotes from Alfred Song in Senate Press Release]
4. “My bills say that when you buy an appliance, an automobile, or other
product that is defective and is covered by a warranty, you have the
legal right to have it repaired or replaced if you return it to the retail
seller.” [Letter, Alfred Song]
1. “There is no effective remedy aside from the courts. Certain private and
government agencies collect complaints of shady business dealings, but
they will not act to reimburse the customer. Filing suit in court is the
best alternative for the consumer.” [Alfred Song Press Release]
1. “Arbitration programs often do not use the rules and criteria set forth in
the Lemon Law as a basis for awarding a refund or replacement. Some
do not even train their arbitrators to use or understand the Lemon Law.
Many consumers have received decisions calling for further inspections,
diagnosis, repairs, extended warranties, or simply nothing at
all—despite the fact that they had already had their car repaired
numerous times.” [CalPirg Letter]
1. “An informal dispute settlement mechanism incorporated into the terms
of a written warranty shall be funded and competently staffed at a level
sufficient to ensure fair and expeditious resolution of all disputes, and
shall not charge consumers any fee for the use of the mechanism. The
mechanism must be sufficiently insulated from the warrantor so that the
decision of the members and the performance of the staff are not
influenced by either the warrantor or the sponsor. This includes, at a
minimum, committing funds in advance, basing personnel decisions
solely on merit, and not assigning conflicting warrantor or sponsor
duties to mechanism staff persons. Minimal operational requirements
for such matters as staffing, investigative procedures, time limits,
recordkeeping, audits, and confidentiality are established.” [US Law
Week summary of FTC guidelines for warranty structures.]
2. “The arbitration programs, either operated or sponsored by
manufacturers, are not providing a fair and impartial process for
consumers seeking relief from defective new cars. These programs do
not comply with FTC minimum guidelines for third party dispute
resolution processes nor do they abide by the provisions of the
California lemon law.” [Letter from CalPirg, 1970]
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Appendix 2
ADR Logic

Example

Quickness (resolve
disputes quickly)

Informality (resolve
disputes informally)

Saving costs

Flexibility (extralegal
remedies, flexible
solutions)

Privacy (case resolved
outside courts)

1. “Chrysler can’t afford any dissatisfied purchasers, so it has
established a procedure of using third parties to resolve, in a matter
of weeks instead of years, disputes between the purchaser and the
dealer over an unrepaired component of the vehicle during the
warranty period. This is accomplished through Customer Satisfaction
Arbitration Boards (CSAB).” [Letter from A. E. Davis, A. E. Davis
& Co., to Members of Senate Judiciary Committee, CA legislature
(Aug. 7, 1981)]
1. “The idea of General Motors’ arbitration program, which is
voluntary and predates the [sic] California’s lemon law . . . is that it
be informal and non-legal, that the process be easily understood by
the consumer, and that a lengthy court setting be avoided.” [GM
letter to CA legislature]
1. “In summary, we believe this Chrysler CSAB program is a far better
way, and certainly less costly in time and money to the car owner, to
get a satisfactory resolution to the problem of the so-called ‘Lemon’
car than the long, drawn out method embodied in AB 1787.” [Letter
from A. E. Davis, A. E. Davis & Co., to Members of Senate
Judiciary Committee, CA legislature (Aug. 7, 1981)]
1. “The decisions, so far, have ranged all the way from denying that
the purchaser had a valid case to ordering the dealer and Chrysler to
replace the vehicle with a new one. Replacement has taken place in
four instances . . . so this system works and in a matter of weeks,
not years as would be the case under AB 1787. The final decision is
binding on Chrysler and the dealer, but not on the customer who still
has the option of going to court.”
1. “This bill will place an undue burden of time and expense on the
aggrieved purchaser by forcing him or her to go to court to prove
that the vehicle’s nonconformity fits the language of the amendment.
Chrysler has a better idea that doesn’t cost the purchaser a cent, not
even a postage stamp. Chrysler has established 54 CSAB covering
all 50 states. . . . In summary, Mrs. Tanner, we believe this CSAB
program is a far better, and certainly less costly, way to get a
properly running vehicle back in the hands of its owner than by the
procedures facing him in your bill.” [Letter, A. E. Davis & Co.]
2. “On the other hand, we hate terribly to be an over-legislated industry
where before any decision or any judgment is made that you need a
battery of lawyers to decide what is to be done relative to the best
interest of both the consumer and the industry itself. We would like
very much to have a system, perhaps, that would be very simple,
one that doesn’t take time because most of these owners that have
complaints, I’m sure they don’t want to get involved in litigation, get
involved in debates. They don’t want to hear the preamble or the
Gettysburg Address. They want quick and easy decisions to resolve
their problems.” [Testimony in Vermont, Larry Handy, President VT
Auto Dealers Association, 1984]
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Appendix 3
Business Logic

Productivity (solve
problems, task
oriented)

Efficiency/efficient
management (keep
costs down)

Managerial discretion
and control (over
organizational
decisions)
Customer satisfaction
(desire to keep
customers happy)

Profit (organization’s
desire to increase
revenue)

Example

1. “I think it’s fair to ask when one considers this legislation whether the intent is to
solve the problem or the intent is to encourage litigation. We feel that the intent
should be to solve the problem and we think the arbitration system is perhaps one
of the best ways to accomplish that.” [Testimony in Vermont, Gene Wagner, MV
Manu. Association]
1. “We believe this proposed legislation will greatly increase the number of frivolous
and unmeritorious lawsuits filed against motor vehicle manufacturers. Inevitably,
an increased dependence upon the over-burdened court system will lead to
increased costs for Ford, and, subsequently its customers. Ford and its dealers have
taken great strides in establishing a speedy, inexpensive, and fair system to resolve
product disputes as an effective alternative to lengthy and costly dependence on the
courts.” [Ford Press Release]
1. “The California Manufacturers Association says that these bills are
unnecessary restrictions on big business.” [Press Release, CA State Capitol, 1970]

1. “As self-regulating mechanisms . . . their very existence means that our dealers and
our own personnel are perceived as taking the extra steps required to resolve issues
to the satisfaction of customers.” [Ford Consumer Appeals Board, 1980s]
2. “American Honda feels that the current laws adequately protect the consumer,
while maintaining a fair balance with both the dealer and manufacturer. We
realized many years ago that it is in our own best interest to assure customer
satisfaction with our products and this philosophy has paid dividends in repeat
sales. We pledge to continue this corporate position well into the future.” [Letter
from Honda to CA legislature, 1981]
3. “Chrysler can’t afford any dissatisfied purchasers, so it has established a procedure
of using third parties to resolve, in a matter of weeks instead of years, disputes
between the purchaser and the dealer over an unrepaired component of the vehicle
during the warranty period. This is accomplished through Customer Satisfaction
Arbitration Boards (CSAB).” [Letter from A. E. Davis, A. E. Davis & Co., to
Members of Senate Judiciary Committee, CA legislature (Aug. 7, 1981)]
1. “We believe this proposed legislation will greatly increase the number of frivolous
and unmeritorious lawsuits filed against motor vehicle manufacturers. Inevitably,
an increased dependence upon the over-burdened court system will lead to
increased costs for Ford, and, subsequently its customers. Ford and its dealers have
taken great strides in establishing a speedy, inexpensive, and fair system to resolve
product disputes as an effective alternative to lengthy and costly dependence on the
courts.” [Ford Press Release]
2. “The present SB Act and volunteer manufacturer and dealer warranties already
provide mechanisms for resolving customer complaints and their flexibility allows
for mediation or binding arbitration, mandating a dealer to repurchase an
automobile after four attempts to correct a possibly minor problem will surely
increase the likelihood of costly and time-consuming litigation, these costs would
ultimately have to be recouped by increased automobile prices. The consumer is
presently very well protected by present law and voluntary warranty provisions,
AB 1787 raises the real possibility of undermining this protection by setting the
stage for protracted lawsuits. Instead, AB 1787 is not in the best interests of the
consumer, please vote against it.” [Telegram Letter, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corp., 1981]
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